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MICHIGAN WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION
ACT AMENDMENTS: A RESPONSE
TO THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972
Water pollution control is a recognized national problem1 and a
chronic element of it is the deficient enforcement provisions of most water
pollution control legislation. 2 Congress attempted to remedy this situation
by creating a new national focus for the solution through the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA). 3
This recent federal effort adds a new dimension to the evolution of
water pollution control methods. Traditionally, a person injured by water
pollution had a cause of action under nuisance law for damages or an
injunction, or both. 4 Private law remedies proved inadequate to control
water pollution, fostering the development of state regulatory agencies

1 For adescription of the current problem of water pollution, see NAT'L WATER
63-1 10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NWC
REPORT]. See also F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 317-45 (1968); D. ZwIcK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND (1971);
Legal Control of Water Pollution, I U. CALIF. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1969).
2 Enforcement provisions of water pollution control statutes have traditionally been
the least emphasized. Stein, Problems and Programs in Water Pollution, 2 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 388, 408-09 (1962). Weak enforcement of water pollution laws is one
of the serious shortcomings in any effort to abate water pollution. Hearings on S. 75,
S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 523, S. 573, S. 601, S. 679, S. 927, S. 1011, S. 1012, S. 1013,
S. 1014, S. 1015, and S. 1017 Before the Subcomin. on Air and Water Pollution of
the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 719 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as 1971 Senate Hearings].
COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE

3

33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1972). For analyses and legislative histories of the

FWPCA see R.

ZENER,

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL

1 (prepublication edition, to be published by the Environmental

Law Institute, 1973); Kuchenbecker & Long, Will Municipal Sewage Continue to
Threaten Primary Water-Contact Recreation? An Appraisal of the 1972 Water Pollution Control Act, 4 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 260 (1973); McThenia & Cohen, An
Examination of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 30
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 195 (1973); Comment, The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 672 (1973); Comment,
Federal Water Pollution Legislation: Current Proposals to Achieve More Effective
Enforcement, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 749 (1972); Note, The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: Effective Controls at Last? 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 403 (1972); Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972: Ambiguity as a Control Device, 10 HARV. J. LEGis. 565 (1973); Comment,
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 1973 WIsc. L. REV893. See also Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the
Commerce Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1067, 1070-78 (1965). This Note deals with the FWPCA only to the extent that

it affects state water pollution control efforts.

4 See generally J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY 422-31 (1968); Davis,
Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wisc. L. REV. 738; Note, Private
Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1970).
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designed to abate existing water pollution and control future pollution. 5
Typically, the agency enabling statutes set up a system whereby permits
are issued to waste effluent dischargers. The permits require compliance
with specified water quality and effluent standards; the statute supplies
accompanying penalties for noncompliance. 6 The FWPCA adopts this
general scheme, 7 and, while recognizing the important regulatory role of
the states, 8 reserves residual power in the federal government to control
water pollution.9 In order to conform to FWPCA requirements, Michigan
recently amended its water pollution control legislation, the Water Resources Commission Act (WRC Act). 10
This article appraises the strengths and weaknesses of the WRC Act
and its recent amendments. After a description of the federal impetus
behind the new amendments, the Michigan statutory framework is evaluated, including comparison of the WRC Act with a model state act designed to meet FWPCA requirements." Finally, the past implementation of the Act is discussed, with suggestions for future improvement.
I. THE IMPACT OF THE FWPCA ON MICHIGAN

A. The FWPCA and Michigan Statutory Deficiencies
The FWPCA, calling for the elimination of all pollutant discharges into
navigable waters by 1985,12 is a comprehensive 13 response to the water
pollution problem. It resulted from a call for uniform national stan5 J. SAX, supra note 4, at 387. See Davis, supra note 4, at 777. See generally Hines,
Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part 1: State Pollution
Control Programs,52 IowA L. REV. 186, 196-201 (1966).
6 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.011 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-101 et seq. (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1001 et seq. (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.006 et seq. (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1973).
7 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1341-42 (Supp. 1972).
8 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. 1972). This section states:
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use -(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources ....
Id. Much of the debates in the hearings on the FWPCA concerned the proper role
and responsibilities of state governments and agencies. See e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings,
supra note 2, at 543-44.
9 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. 1972).
10 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.1 et seq. (1967 and Supp. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as WRC Act]. See No. 293, [19721 Mich. Pub. Acts 896; No. 3, [19731 Mich.
Pub. Acts (1973 West's Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1 at 9). For an evaluation of the WRC
Act prior to its recent amendments, see Symposium-Statutory Water Pollution Control-The Michigan Water Resources Commission Act: Observations and Suggestions,
19 WAYNE L. REV. 131 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
11 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, State Water Pollution Control Act, in 1974
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 36-48 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
12 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. 1972). The no-discharge goal has been severely
criticized as disregarding physical realities, social goals, and economic and environmental necessities. NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 70.
13 See 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. 1972). The comprehensiveness of FWPCA has been
criticized as ignoring a perceived need for "site specific" pollution abatement. NWC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 63-64. See notes 149-51 and accompanying text infra.
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dards I4 to remedy prior federal' and state", failures to abate water
pollution. Prior to the enactment of the FWPCA, state and federal efforts were marked by enmity rather than cooperation.' 7 States regularly
14 See

HOUSE COMM.

ON PUBLIC

WORKS,

FEDERAL WATER

POLLUTION

CONTROL

ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 398-402 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. A principal argument for uniform national
standards is that they would allow local enforcement of anti-pollution laws without
fear of an industry migration. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 612, 724-25;
D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, supra note 1, at 231. Industry reaction to uniform national
standards has been mixed. Compare 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 666, 1064,
1182, with id. at 736. If water pollution is viewed as a technological problem requiring a systemic approach, the case for national uniformity of control is even stronger.
See Kramon, Towards a New Federal Response to Water Pollution, 31 FED. B.J. 139,
141 (1972).
15 D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, supra note 1, at 229. For discussions of federal water
pollution control efforts prior to the FWPCA see Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Diflicult)
in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1103 (1970); Note, Clearing
Muddy Waters: The Evolving Federalization of Water Pollution Control, 60 GEO.
L.J. 742 (1972). See generally S. DEGLER, FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAMS
(1969); Stein, The Actual Operation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Adniistration, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 41 (1970).
16 NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 82. In 1971, it was estimated that there existed
fifteen to twenty "relatively good," fifteen mediocre, and fifteen to twenty poor state
programs. Hearings on H.R. 11896, H.R. 11895 Before the House Comm. on Public
Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 277 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 House Hearings].
Hines has determined that the "social laboratory" theory of allowing states to work
out local solutions to local problems tends to be validated in practice. Hines, supra
note 5, at 215. In spite of this arguably positive role of the states, both statutory and
implementation deficiencies in the Michigan program have been noted:
We felt that a strong Federal bill was necessary because State and
local programs too often failed to provide adequate standards and
enforcement procedures. Our department has found this to be true in
many States including Michigan.
Public Hearing on State of Michigan 402(b) Request to Operate NPDES Permit Program 56-57 (1973) (statement of John Yolton, United Auto Workers) [hereinafter
cited Public Hearing].
Furthermore, the Water Quality Act of 1965, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (1970), required
states to develop water quality standards for interstate and coastal waters. The subsequent failure of the states to establish relationships between receiving water quality and
effluent standards was another rationale for the establishment of federal effluent
standards. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 388-89.
17 SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION

CONTROL

ACT

AMENDMENTS OF 1971, S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as SENATE REPORT]. States have historically complained about federal efforts in
water pollution control. See, e.g., Mich. Water Resources Comm'n, 46 Q. BULL. 4
(1964). See also Hearings on Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971 (Oversight
of Existing Program)Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 10, at 431-36 (1971) [hereinafter cited as House Oversight Hearings]. State
agencies' opposition to federal programs may be a result of their fear of displacement
upon federal assumption of authority. See SAX, New Direction in the Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 8 (C. Hassett ed. 1971).
There has been some federal-state cooperation of necessity. In 1971, the permit
system instituted under the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970), was limited
in scope to navigable waters. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1971).
See generally Note, The Refuse Act: Its Role Within the Scheme of Fedral Water
Quality Legislation, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 304 (1971). Since the Refuse Act also prohibits
discharges into nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters, industries situated on
these tributaries would therefore have been compelled to cease discharging and
close down operations or be regulated by the states. As a consequence, on September
11, 1972, Michigan and the Environmental Protection Agency signed an agreement
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complained of duplication of efforts, 18 disruption of programs,"

and

funding insufficiencies2 11caused by federal programs. The FWPCA appears to answer these objections by ostensibly delegating primary enforcement responsibility to the states21 and appropriating needed monies to
21
them.22 States may operate only within federally established guidelines,
however, and thus cooperative effort to control water pollution has been
forced upon the states.
The heart of the federal-state effort is the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES).2 -1 The system sets up a procedure whereby

whereby Michigan would issue permits to municipal and industrial dischargers under
federal guidelines. This agreement was to have given Michigan almost total control
over policing industrial dischargers. 3 BNA ENv. REP. CURRENT DEVS. 603 (1972).
18 See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 384, 385. Some advocate that the
federal government intervene only in cases where states have failed in their attempts
to control pollution. Id. at 543-44.
I') Flexible state methods of pollution control are said to be disrupted by federal
preemption. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 106. States have been exceedingly
critical of the strict pollution program under the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1970), which "placed the Federal Government with boots and helmets in the
front office of nearly every waste-discharging industry in the nation." Hearings on
Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971 (Proposed Amendments to Existing
Legislation) Before the House Conln. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16,
at 1363 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 House Amendment Hearings].
20 See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 458-89.
21 Federal enforcement activity will not commence until 30 days after a state has
failed to take appropriate action. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (Supp. 1972). See also HousE
REPORT, supra note 14, at 115. The federal government will reserve its power for enforcement actions of national scope. SENATE REPORT, supra note 17, at 64. It should
be noted that earlier federal programs granted the states much greater independent
powers to control water pollution than does the FWPCA. See Barry, supra note 15, at
1118.
22
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1256(a), 1285, 1287 (Supp. 1972). There has been considerable controversy over exactly how much money the states will receive from
FWPCA grants. At the express direction of the President, EPA disbursed less than
half of the sewage treatment plant construction funds authorized under Sections
205 and 207 of the FWPCA. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1285, 1287 (Supp. 1972). Suits were
immediately brought to require disbursement of the allotted funds. The court held
that the FWPCA requires full disbursement of all authorized funds. City of New
York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669, 679 (D.D.C. 1973). Furthermore, withholding
the funds was declared an abuse of executive discretion. Campaign Clean Water, Inc.
v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689, 700 (E.D. Va. 1973). See also Maine v. Fri, 483
F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1973).
2 The FWPCA creates preemptive federal effluent and water quality standards. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312 (Supp. 1972). If the states fail to adhere to federal enforcement
requirements, the FWPCA explicitly mandates that the federal government will assume
responsibility for pollution control in that state. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2) (Supp. 1972).
The enunciated policy is to preserve the primary right of the states to control water
pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. 1972). However, a similar declaration in the
earlier Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970), was held
not to affect the clear intent of the Act that federal law controls the pollution of
interstate waters. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102 (1972).
In the FWPCA, there are some concessions to state independence. States may
establish effluent standards more strict than those established by the federal government. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. 1972). See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, supra at 107
(1972). States may also promulgate effluent standards for new point sources within
the state, 33 U.S.C. § 1316(c) (Supp. 1972), and certify the operation of point sources

licensed by federal agencies, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (Supp. 1972).
24

33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. 1972).
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the federal government will issue permits which require waste dischargers
to comply with effluent limitations, 5 water quality limitations, 26 and
toxic materials discharge requirements. "7 Although initial permit-issuing
authority is vested in the federal government, it may be delegated to
states on an interim28 or permanent -1 basis if the state statutes and
regulations meet federal guidelines, as established by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) 0° When the FWPCA was enacted, it appeared
that most states would have to enact new legislation in order to meet the
federal guidelines." The states' desire to improve their legislation to meet
federal standards rather than dismantle existing programs was implicit in
the delegation rationale.
The WRC Act prior to the FWPCA failed to meet these NPDES
guidelines. In the first place, the "order of determination" system administered by the Michigan Water Resources Commission (WRC).12 was not
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. 1972). "Effluent limitation" is defined as
any restriction established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and
other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (Supp. 1972).
26 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (Supp. 1972).
27 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp. 1972). "Toxic pollutant" means
those pollutants, or combinations of pollutants, including diseasecausing agents, which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion,
inhalation or assimilation into any organism, either directly from the
environment or indirectly by ingestion through food chains, will, on the
basis of information available to the Administrator, cause death,
disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction) or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (Supp. 1972).
28 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5) (Supp. 1972).
29) 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. 1972).
3040 C.F.R. § 124 (1973).
31 3 BNA ENV. REP., CURRENT DEVS. 823 (1972). States have not automatically
received permanent NPDES authority upon passage of new legislation. The Kansas
NPDES application was denied because its newly enacted statute contained inadequate legal authority to issue permits with effluent limitations. See 4 BNA ENV. REP.,
CURRENT DEVS. 913 (1973). See also Coggins, Regulation of Air and Water Quality
in Kansas: A Critical Look at Legislative Ambiguity and AdminiAtrative Discretion,
21 Kansas L. Rev. 1 (1972).
32 The WRC has basic jurisdiction over water pollution control in Michigan. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.2 (Supp. 1973). This authority has been reinforced by concerted application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine by the Michigan courts. See
White Lake Improvement Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 281-82,
177 N.W.2d 473, 480-82 (1970).
The WRC recently has been given jurisdiction over pollution in county drains
(MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 280.423 (Supp. 1973)), soil erosion and sedimentation
(Id. § 282.101 et seq. (Supp. 1973)), and beach erosion (Id. § 281.632(d), (e), (g),
-. 635-.636 (Supp. 1973)). These additions to WRC jurisdiction give it authority over
nearly every type of pollutant likely to reach the waters of the state.
Several other state and local governmental units, however, have some authority to
regulate water pollution. Authority over water works and sewage systems is granted
to the public health department. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 325.201-.210 (1967).
Local health departments have the power to deal with water quality problems related
to health. Id. § 41.181 (townships); id. § 46.171 (counties) id. §§ 67.47, -.54 (villages);
25
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equivalent to the FWPCA permit system.13 Secondly, the discretionary
fine of up to $10,000 in the WRC Act 34 did not meet the EPA guidelines which require that state penalty provisions be comparable to the
:5
$2,500 minimum and $25,000 maximum fines specified in the FWPCA. 1
Also, ambiguous statutory language could be construed to exempt violations of WRC orders from prosecution under the WRC Act.36 Thirdly,
the WRC itself did not conform to the EPA guidelines requiring that
board members not have monetary conflicts of interest.3 7 Finally, there
id. §§ 94.1-.8 (fourth class cities). Local governments also are authorized to regulate
the abatement of water pollution, id. § 45.515(c) (counties), and the purity of waters.
id. § 67.38 (villages), id. §§ 91.1, 97.4 (fourth class cities). It should also be noted
that the Attorney General has independent authority to abate violations of Section 6
of the WRC Act as public nuisances. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6(c) (Supp.
1973). See Attorney General v. Peterson, 381 Mich. 445, 465-66, 164 N.W.2d 43, 53
(1969).
33 Orders of determination set forth mandatory remedial action to be taken by a
person found in violation of the WRC Act. This system was instituted in the 1949
WRC Act, No. 117, § 7, [1949] Mich. Pub. Acts 121, to replace a previous requirement that a violator merely report his corrective action. See No. 245, § 7, [19291
Mich. Pub. Acts 598. The FWPCA permit system, on the other hand, requires
pollutant dischargers to comply with statutory and administrative guidelines and
standards irrespective of any violation of the FWPCA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)
(Supp. 1972). The Water Resources Commission has traditionally considered this
procedure substantively different from "permits." Interview with William G. Turney,
Chief, Bureau of Water Management and Water Resources Comm'n, Michigan Dep't
of Natural Resources, in Lansing, Michigan, Oct. 8, 1973. See Mich. Water Resources Comm'n, 14 Q. BULL. 3 (1956). See generally Symposium, supra note 10, at
145-48 (description of the Michigan order of determination system).
34 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973). The $10,000 fine replaced a
mandatory $500 minimum fine. See No. 405, § 10, [1965] Mich. Pub. Acts 825. This
change was probably a result of judicial confusion in regard to the lack of a maximum
fine. See Symposium, supra note 10, at 159. The amended penalty section may not
have been an improvement, for the language fixing the amount of the fine allows a
violator to be fined nothing even if convicted.
35 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) -(d) (Supp. 1972).
36 No. 159, § 10, [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts 257 states in part:
A person, or any governmental unit, who discharges any substance
into the waters of the state contrary to the provisions of section 6 or
who fails to comply with section 13, is guilty of a misdemeanor and
may be fined not more than $10,000.00 for each violation .... [T]he
person shall not be subject to the penalties of this section if the discharge of the effluent is in conformance with and obedient to a rule or
order of the commission.
Violation of WRC orders had formerly been explicitly punishable. See No. 117, § 9,
[1949] Mich. Pub. Acts 122.
37 EPA Guidelines state that
[e]ach State or interstate agency participating in the NPDES shall insure
that any board or body which approves NPDES permit applications
or portions thereof shall not include as a member, any person who
receives, or has during the previous 2 years received, a significant
portion of his income directly or indirectly from permit holders or
applicants for a permit.
40 C.F.R. § 124.94 (1973). These guidelines do not exclude from state board membership persons who are merely employed by permit holders. Nevertheless, California,
Michigan, and Missouri felt that their water pollution control boards would be affected
by the federal requirements. 3 BNA ENv. REP., CURRENT DEVS. 969, 970 (1972).
Representatives of municipal and industry groups on the Michigan Water Resources
Commission were forced to resign because of the EPA guidelines. Statement by
Attorney General, in MICH. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, MICHIGAN'S WASTEWATER
DISCHARGE PERMIT PROGRAM 79-80 (1973).
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was no statutory requirement that the WRC pursue a continuing
process. :'s While the WRC could implement the NPDES with
its program remaining intact, the deficient elements of standards,
ment penalties, and planning had to be modified to comply with
federal law.

planning
most of
enforcethe new

B. The Initial Michigan Response: Act 293 of 1972
Fearing federal preemption of its water pollution control program,"11
the Michigan legislature amended the WRC Act. 40 The most important
change effected by the first amendment, Act 293, was the institution of
a permit system for the regulation of waste discharges. 41 For the first
time in the WRC Act's history, WRC orders (now permits) to dischargers
must require compliance with state standards. 42 There are two implications of this provision. First, the WRC must set Water quality and
effluent standards.4 3 Secondly, the WRC need no longer rely on the ambiguous language in Section 6 of the WRC Act 44 to determine the exisInterest groups were given representation on the WRC, No. 117, § 1, [1949] Mich.
Pub. Acts 120, when water pollution was recognized as more than merely a public
health problem. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE ADMINISTRATION OF
WATER RESOURCES

23 (1957). Interest group representation was to ensure coopera-

tion with all affected interest groups as well as state agencies concerned with water
pollution control. M. WEISS, INDUSTRIAL WATER POLLUTION 6 (1951).
38 Section 2a of the WRC Act, added in 1949, might be construed to allow the
WRC to carry out a planning process for water pollution control. No. 117, § 2a,
[1949] Mich. Pub. Acts 121. As of 1957, however, Michigan was not one of the
twenty states that authorized its water pollution agency to administer a planning
program. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE ADMINISTRATION OF WATER
RESOURCES 38-44 (1957). Also, there was no indication, prior to the enactment of
the FWPCA, that Michigan was pursuing a comprehensive water quality planning
process. Most state statutes enacted prior to the FWPCA give water pollution control agencies the power or duty to formulate comprehensive pollution control plans.

See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 926.3(1) (Cum.Supp. 1973); S.C.
§ 63-195.8(9) (Supp. 1971); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 21.062 (1972).

CODE ANN.

39 H.B. 6186 (later enacted as Act 293 of 1972) was designed to conform the WRC
Act to pending federal legislation in order to ensure that the WRC could continue to
administer "an uninterrupted pollution control program." MICH. DEP'T OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 6186 at 1 (1972). See notes 27-31 and accompanying
text supra.
40 No. 293, [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts 896.
41 No. 293, § 7, [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts 899-900.
42 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.5 (Supp. 1973).
43 Prior to 1972, the WRC was not required by the WRC Act to promulgate water
pollution standards. See note 68 infra. Other states also require, rather than merely
authorize, agencies to set standards. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-28-8
(Cum.Supp. 1967); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 63-195.7 (Supp. 1971).
44 Section 6(a) of the WRC Act now states:
It shall be unlawful for any persons directly or indirectly to discharge
into the waters of the state any substance which is or may become
injurious to the public health, safety, or welfare; or which is or may
become injurious to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural,
recreational or other uses which are being or may be made of such
waters; or which is or may become injurious to the value or utility
of riparian lands; or which is or may become injurious to livestock,
wild animals, birds, fish, aquatic life or plants or the growth or propagation thereof be prevented or injuriously affected; or whereby the
value of fish and game is or may be destroyed or impaired.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6(a) (Supp. 1973).
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tence of a violation. Another new clause makes violations of permit provisions, existing orders, and stipulations 45 actionable by the WRC. 46
Act 293 thus made every waste discharger in Michigan subject to enforceable WRC permits.
The scope of the WRC Act was significantly increased by Act 293.
Storage of materials likely to affect water quality became subject to permit restrictions. 47 Underground waters of the state were completely protected from any type of pollution, 4s whereas prior to this amendment they
had been given statutory protection only from pollution discharged underground. 41' The WRC was also authorized to conduct areawide water qual45 A stipulation is an agreement reached between the WRC and a discharger on the
terms of a proposed permit. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.7(2) (Supp. 1973).
Stipulation allows the discharger to eliminate the necessity of a public hearing concerning his proposed permit, and therefore avoids any possible adverse publicity
asising out of the proceedings. In 1970, however, stipulations were judicially declared
equivalent to WRC orders in order to bring them to the attention of the public.
White Lake Improvement Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 277, 177
N.W.2d 473, 479 (1970).
Much of the WRC's administrative work in the past was accomplished in this
manner. In 1971-72, nearly one-half of all waste discharge proceedings were completed by stipulation. 26 MICH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES BIENNIAL REP. 33
(1972). Stipulations cannot, however, be made under the FWPCA-influenced WRC
Act. Moreover, any fears about inadequate public disclosure brought about by the use
of stipulations should be dispelled by new wastewater discharge permit rules which
contain detailed public notice resuirements. See Mich. Ad. Code R 323.2117-.2127,
in Mich. Dep't of Natural Resources, Water Resources Comm'n Release, General
Rules Part 21: Wastewater Discharge Permits (1973).
46 Compare No. 293, § 10, [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts 901 with No. 159, § 10, [1972]
Mich. Pub. Acts 257. See note 36 and accompanying text supra. A severe deficiency
in Section 10 of Act 293 is that the mere discharge of pollutants is not subject to a
fine until it becomes a Section 6 violation, even if the discharge violates "pollution
standards" promulgated by the WRC. See note 44 supra. Prior to the discharge's
becoming a Section 6 violation, the WRC Act merely requires the WRC to issue a
permit for such a discharge.
47 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.5 (Supp. 1973). The original H.B. 6186 contained much broader language. Instead of just storage of pollutants, "other acts
altering or otherwise affecting" the water quality would have fallen within the ambit
of the WRC Act's protection. H.B. 6186 (1972). The provision for storage of materials was submitted at the request of the Department of Agriculture. See MICH.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 6186 at 2 (1972).
48 Groundwaters were added to the definition of "waters of the state." Compare
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.11(b) (Supp. 1973) with id. § 323.11 (1967).
4 The Stream Control Commission, the WRC's predecessor, did not have jurisdiction over subterranean, percolating, or other underground waters. [1949-1950]
MICH. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 7, 9. The WRC, however, was explicitly given
control over the pollution of both surface and underground waters. No. 117, § 2,
[1949] Mich. Pub. Acts 120. It was specifically directed to exercise this control only
in 1972, when amendatory legislation required industries discharging wastes in any
waters of the state to have treatment and control facilities. No. 129, [19721 Mich.
Pub. Acts 215. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6a (Supp. 1973).
Many state water pollution control statutes apply to both surface and underground
water. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-28-2(g) (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 25-54b (Supp. 1973). Some statutes, however, relate only to surface waters.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:1433 (1952); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149:1
(1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-12-1 (1971). The FWPCA does not specifically
include groundwaters with in its coverage. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. 1972). For
this reason, Michigan users of groundwaters for pollution discharges will be subject
to a permit issued solely under state authority. See WATER RESOURCES COMM'N,
BUREAU OF WATER MANAGEMENT, MICH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE
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ity planning. 5° The establishment of the permit system and the creation
of authority for comprehensive planning by Act 293 allowed Michigan to
become one of ten states initially granted interim authority5 ' to issue
NPDES permits. The lack of sufficiently strong monetary penalties in the
WRC Act, 52 however, prevented delegation of permanent NPDES authority to the Michigan Water Resources Commission.

C. The Final Michigan Response: Act 3 of 1973
Amendment of the WRC Act's monetary penalty provision was necessary in order to fully comply with federal NPDES requirements and
thereby preserve Michigan's water pollution administration. The fear was
expressed by the legislature that if EPA were to assume the administration of water pollution control in Michigan, the Michigan program would
be downgraded. 53 Nevertheless, the Department of Natural Resources
(DNR), the agency presently responsible for the Michigan pollution control program, 54 advised passage of the amendment since higher monetary penalties would be less onerous than complete federal control, even
for the interests which would be adversely affected.-5
Act 3 imposes a blanket minimum criminal fine of $2,500, with a maximum of $25,000, for all violations of the WRC Act, any permit, or
WRC rule, and for misrepresentation in a permit application or for tampering with a monitoring device.5 6 The WRC Act also gives the courts
57
discretionary power -to levy a $10,000 civil penalty on violators.

Act 3 changed the former absolute liability of a municipality for dis-

at 24 (1973). Arguably, however, the FWPCA can be construed to include jurisdiction over groundwater. See
Comment, Groundwater Pollution in the Western States-Private Remedies and
Federal and State Legislation, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 537, 554 (1973).
50 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 323.2a (Supp. 1973). See note 38 supra.
51 3 BNA ENV. REP., CURRENT DEVS. 969 (1972).
52 4 BNA ENV. REP., CURRENT DEvs. 365 (1973).
53 MICH. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ANALYSIS DIVISION, ANALYSIS of S.B. 107
(1973).
54 On January 11, 1973, the statutory authority of the WRC was transferred to the.
DNR under a type II transfer, which required the WRC to act in an advisory capacity
to the DNR. Exec. Order 1973-2, § 2, MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 299.11 (1973
West's Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1 at 58-59). Under this reorganization plan, the WRC
would have become little more than a hearing body. Appearently, industrial concerns
feared that the DNR would act much more strictly toward it than had the WRC. The
North Woods Call, Mar. 14, 1973, at 1. Two months later, the WRC was restored to.
its quasi-judicial powers in rule-making, enforcement, and order-issuance relating to,
water pollution control. Exec. Order 1973-2a, § 1, MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 299.11 (1973 West's Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1 at 61). The DNR, however, still
retains authority to oversee WRC action.
55 MICH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ANALYSIS OF S.B.107 at 2 (1973).
56 No. 3, § 10, [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (1973 West's Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1 at 11).
57 No. 3, § 10(1), [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (1973 West's Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1 at
11). Most other states which have complied with FWPCA guidelines have instituted
comparable civil penalties. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13385 (West Supp. 1973);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1274 (6) (Supp. 1973). But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-39-9
(Supp. 1973) (maximum $1000).
OF MICHIGAN WATER STRATEGY FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974,
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charge of raw sewage. 58 Instead of being -in prima facie violation of the
WRC Act and therefore subject to penalties, such a discharge is now subject
only to administrative remedies.5 9 This provision will presumably exempt
from monetary penalties municipalities that have temporary treatment
plant overflows beyond their control. If the municipality has a valid permit, however, it is subject to the penalty provisions without any intervening administrative review of the violation. 60 This stringent provision will
most likely have the beneficial effect of eliminating any future raw sewage discharges by municipalities fearful of being fined up to $25,000 for
each act.
The primary effect of Act 3 was to enable Michigan to become the
fourth state to receive NPDES authority. 61 A more long-term effect of
the passage of Act 3 should be the improvement of water pollution control in Michigan. It appears that this improvement would never have
taken place without federal incentives.

II. ADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT WRC ACT

An effective program of water pollution control enforcement contains
three basic elements: precise standards, adequate penalties, and the authority to implement the standards and levy the penalties. The WRC Act,
prior to its new amendments, employed inadequate standards and penalties. Although these deficiencies have, to some extent, been corrected,
much improvement can yet be made.

A. Standards
An ideal water pollution control statute utilizes three components in
establishing standards: a legislatively enunciated goal, water quality standards, and effluent limitations. A legislative goal mandating the eventual
elimination of water pollution 62 gives the implementing agency a direction in which to orient the two other elements. The legislature should

58 Compare No. 3, § 6(b), [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (1973 West's Mich. Legis. Serv.
No. 1 at 10) with MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 323.6(b) (Supp. 1973).

59 No. 3, § 6(b), [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (1973 West's Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1 at
10).
60 Id. This statutory remedy removes the common law liability of municipalities
under the former Section 6(b). See White Lake Improvement Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 275, 117 N.W.2d 473, 478 (1970).
61 Michigan received permanent NPDES authority on October 18, 1973. 4 BNA
ENV. REP., CURRENT DEVS. 1115 (1973). By amending its water pollution control
statute on December 12, 1972, California was the first state to be granted permanent
NPDES authority. See CALIF. WATER CODE §§ 13370-89 (Supp. 1973); 4 BNA ENv.
REP., CURRENT DEVS. 131 (1973).
62 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(1) (Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-54a
(Supp. 1973).
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declare unlawful any pollution that is not specifically permitted. 63 This
declaration means that any discharge of pollutants becomes an expicit
privilege authorized because of technological limits, a result obtained by
the institution of the permit system under Act 293, rather than an inherent
power to use waters for waste disposal. 64 A second effect of this declaration is that pollution is precisely defined, 65 a result yet to be accomplish in Michigan.
Water quality standards66 are one step beyond a legislative definition
of pollution, because they inform the enforcement agency, in quantitative
terms, when pollution exists. The standards are based on the theory that
water can, to a certain extent, assimilate waste without harm.67 Michigan
generally used this approach68 until the enactment of the FWPCA. The
63 The WRC Act has always declared certain types of pollution to be unlawful
and a nuisance. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6(a), (c) (Supp. 1973). See note 44
supra. A "public nuisance" provision of this type retained from older statutes does
have some utility for a state subject to the FWPCA. Under the FWPCA there can
be no prosecution of a discharger who complies with his permit, even though he is.
simultaneously violating water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (Supp. 1972).
In Michigan, however, if any water quality or other standards are being violated
by discharges under a validly issued federal permit, the WRC has independent
authority, pursuant to its public nuisance abatement power, to revise the permit
conditions. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.7(1) (Supp. 1973), as amended, No. 3,
§ 7(1), [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (West's 1973 Mich. Legis. Serv. No. t at 10). See
Public Hearing, supra note 16, at 78. See also S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 46-2524(l) (Supp. 1973).
64 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (Supp. 1972). See also SENATE REPORT, supra
note 17, at 42.
65 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (Supp. 1972). But see NWC REPORT, supra
note 1, at 69.
The absence of a comprehensive definition of "pollution" in the WRC Act has been
a historic and continuing deficiency. See, e.g., MICH. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, 7
Q. BULL. 2 (1955). The Michigan legislature has been content with gradually increasing
the scope of values and uses protected from pollution, but has never called for the
outright elimination of water pollution. It would seem that a comprehensive definition
of pollution is precluded by retention of Section 6(a) in the WRC Act. See note 44
supra. The historic development of Section 6(a) is framed in terms of protection of
uses and values from harmful effects caused by polluted waters. A more modern conceptualization of pollution, however, should also contain the nondegradation principle
of harm caused to waters by discharged pollutants.
It appears that most state statutes, while defining the term "pollution", do so in imprecise, use-protection language similar to the Michigan provision. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6302(c) (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE § 39-103(8) (Supp. 1973); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.005(16) (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115.01(5) (1964).
66 Water quality standards employ quantitive parameters related to the amounts
of pollutants per unit of water for designated uses of the water. See generally MICH.
WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, WATER QUALITY

STANDARDS

FOR MICHIGAN INTRASTATE

(1968). The arguments for and against water quality standards are more fully
discussed in Hines, supra note 5, at 220-26.
67 For an example of waters that can assimilate no wastes see Ayer, Water Quality
Control at Lake Tahoe: Dissertation on Grasshopper Soup, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1273
(1970).
68
WATERS

MICH. WATER RESOURCES

COMM'N, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS

FOR MICHIGAN

6 (1968). The WRC has authority under Section 5 of the WRC
Act to establish such water quality standards. 4721 OP. MICH. ATr'Y GEN. 6 (1971).
The standard-setting authority has been unchanged since 1929. See No. 245, § 5,
[1929] Mich. Pub. Acts 597. Section 5 states:
The commission shall establish such pollution standards for lakes,
INTRASTATE WATERS
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water quality standards method, however, is deficient for enforcement
purposes in several ways. First, enforcement of water quality violations
can take place only after the water has been polluted beyond standard
levels. These violations may be extremely difficult to prove. 6'5 Furthermore, administrators do not like this method because it is usually difficult
to determine the origin of a particular pollutant.70 Finally, water quality
standards have limited utility unless they include antidegradation guarantees ensuring that water quality may not be reduced by pollutant discharges. Without such provisions, dischargers have no incentive to refrain
from polluting a stream up to water quality limits. Although Michigan has
stated that it has an antidegradation goal, 71 this goal was not codified until
73
the FWPCA-mandated7 2 water quality rules were promulgated.
Effluent limitations74 are the final requirement for effective water pollution control standards. Although not favored by the states, 75 they are
required by the FWPCA in a fundamental departure from former theories. 76 Prior to enactment of the FWPCA, the WRC used effluent lim77
itations only to control new or increased uses of waste-carrying water.
rivers, streams and other waters of the state in relation to the public
use to which they are or may be put, as it shall deem necessary.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.5 (Supp. 1973). Under this authority the Commission
could apparently promulgate any type of standards or no standards at all, but the
WRC seems never to have done so until state water quality standards were required
by federal statute. See 79 Stat. 907 (1965), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1160(c)(l)-(3) (1970).
69 The use of water quality standards entails many of the same considerations as
those relevant in proving the existance of a nuisance: the source, concentration, and
type of the pollutant, and the identifiable damage caused. See note 4 supra.
70 Lavin, Enforcement of Environmental Law on the Local Level, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

93 (C. Hassett ed. 1971).

71 MICH. WATER RESOURCES

COMM'N, WATER QUALITY

STANDARDS

FOR MICHIGAN

INTRASTATE WATERS 6 (1968). Representatives from Michigan, however, have been

critical of nondegradation standards, claiming that these standards suggest an impractical, absolutist approach. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 384-85.
72 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. 1972). It should be noted that the FWPCA conspicuously
lacks antidegradation standards. Similarly, it appears that twenty states have antidegradation provisions in their regulations, but nonenforcement of these provisions
is the rule rather than the exception, because of inadequate monitoring capabilities.
1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 619-20.
73 Mich. Ad. Code R 323.1041-.1116, in Mich. Dep't of Natural Resources, Water
Resources Comm'n Release, General Rules Part 4: Water Quality Standards (1973).
The new nondegradation rule is not an outright prohibition of degradation. See
Mich. Ad. Code R 323.1098(1) id. The rule uses the "specific injury" language of
Section 6 of the WRC Act. See note 44 supra. It does, however, place the burden on

a discharger to prove that such injury will not occur.
74 See note 25 supra.
75 See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 553-54. The National Water Com-

mission called for a unilateral rescission of effluent standards and a reinstitution of
water quality standards. NWC REPORT, supra note 1, at 92-3.

76 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. 1972). The use of water quality standards entails

characterizing water as a resource to be used for waste assimilation. See notes 66-67
and accompanying text supra. Effluent limitations, on the other hand, impose restrictions on pollutant sources irrespective of the resultant water quality.
77 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.8(b) (Supp. 1973). States must use the effluent
limitation approach in order to be granted NPDES authority. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1972). Michigan has statutory authority to impose effluent
limitations. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.5 (Supp. 1973). See note 68 supra. It
declined to use them as a basis for water pollution control, however, as have most
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This reluctance to use effluent limitations is primarily a result of three
factors. First, states have been unwilling to impose strict effluent limitations on industry, fearing that the industries will emigrate to less strict
locales. The FWPCA, by establishing uniform effluent standards nationwide and requiring stricter standards for new point sources, s will discourage any industrial migration.7 Secondly, there was no statutory command to the WRC to use effluent limitations in its pollution control
program.80 Finally, the lack of sufficient monitoring capabilities8 ' to implement an effluent limitation system discouraged any deviation from existing
water quality standards approaches.
The utility of an effluent limitation enforcement approach is immediately apparent. Complex fact-finding and negotiations required under a
water quality standards approach are no longer necessary. The threshold
for proving a discharge violation is lowered because the agency need
show only a failure to meet effluent restrictions in order to proceed with
enforcement.8 2 Most importantly, unnecessary delays in enforcement, resulting from agency discretion in deciding whom to prosecute, will become apparent once objective means of determining violations are utilized.
B. Penalties
One of the effects of the FWPCA is standardization of state laws. State
water pollution control statutes must generally meet certain federal minimum standards. 83 This uniformity, however, is not necessary -in state
statute fine provisions. Although the FWPCA sets a federal minimum fine
enforceable by the EPA, 4 it does not require states to impose specific

state pollution control commissions.

MICH. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, WATER
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR MICHIGAN INTRASTATE WATERS 6 (1968). See also Weiss,

supra note 37, at 65. There are a few states that began using effluent limtiations
before the FWPCA required them to do so. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-105(3)(k)
(Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1013 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 455B.32(2) (Supp. 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.016(2) (Vernon Supp.
1973).
7 Compare 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(a)(1), (b)(l)(B) (Supp. 1972) with 33 U.S.C.
§1311(b)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1972).
79 The argument has been made that industry relocation depends on factors much
more complex than strict pollution control enforcement. See 1971 Senate Hearings,
supra note 2, at 1088. It has also been noted that effluent standards are preferred by industries because such standards equalize regulation. Maloney & Ausness, Water Quality
Control: .4 Modern Approach to State Regulation, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 28, 44 (1970).
See also 1971 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 269.
80 See note 77 supra.
81 See note 154 infra.
82 Violations of water quality standards may not be immediately traceable to
offending dischargers. See note 69 and accompanying text supra. It would appear
that the simplest enforcement tool for water pollution control would be a no-discharge
rule. The Refuse Act of 1899 was, for that reason, far ahead of its time. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1970). An immediate no-discharge policy, however, would work economic
hardship on present dischargers.
83 See U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1972).
84 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (Supp. 1972).
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minimum or maximum fines. 85
The WRC Act penalties seemingly are some of the strongest under the
FWPCA guidelines. First, the WRC need not show that a violation of the
statute is willful or negligent in order to assess a criminal fine. 86 This provision eliminates many of the difficulties that the WRC might ordinarily
have in proving a violation. The basis for fine assessment is now merely
an unauthorized discharge of pollutants. Furthermore, since the easily administered effluent standards are now the basis for enforcement, it would
seem that the mandatory fines of the WRC Act would be used more
often that when fines were based on flexible water quality standards.
The fines themselves are the highest of any state in the Midwest region.87 All violations of the WRC Act are lumped together under a single
penalty structure, unlike the FWPCA8 8 and the Model Act.8 9 This arrangement is in sharp contrast to earlier eras of token fines,' " which were
85The FWPCA requires that states, which desire NPDES delegation, have
authority to "abate violations of the permit or the permit program, including civil
and criminal penalties and other ways and means of enforcement." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b)(7) (Supp. 1972).
EPA guidelines specify only that the
maximum civil penalties and criminal fines recoverable... shall
(1) be comparable to similar maximum amounts recoverable by the
Regional Administrator under section 309 or (2) represent an actual and
substantial economic deterrent to the actions for which they are assessed
or levied.
40 C.F.R. § 124.73(h) (1973).
The Model Act suggests that states adopt the FWPCA minimum fines of $2,500.
MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 21(a). Although EPA endorses the Model Act provision,
it does not consider the $2,500 minimum mandatory. State minimums of as low as
$250 are acceptable. 3 BNA ENV. REP., CURRENT DEVS. 1448 (1973). Some but not
all states revising their statutes pursuant to the FWPCA have enacted minimum fine
provisions. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13387 (West Supp. 1973) ($2,500); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 453 (Supp. 1973) ($200); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.70
(Supp. 1973) ($100).
86 No. 3, § 10, [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (1973 West's Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1 at 11),
amending MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973). Cf. MODEL ACT, supra
note 11, § 21; No. 117, § 9, [1949] Mich. Pub. Act 122. EPA did not favor requiring
proof of a knowing violation of the statute in order to assess a penalty. 1971 Senate
Hearings, supra note 2, at 69. Some post-FWPCA state statutes require willful
or negligent conduct before there is a violation. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 69-4823 (2) (Supp. 1973); ch. 74, § 147.21(3), [19731 Wisc. Laws (West's 1973 Wisc.
Legis. Serv. No. 2 at 240); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-502.49(c) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
87 Public Hearing, supra note 16, at 67-68. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-1-3-14 (Burns
1973) ($25-$100); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1042 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973)
($10,000 maximum); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115.07 (1964) (no fine provision); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.99A (Page Supp. 1972) ($10,000 maximum); ch. 74, § 147.21
(3), [1973] Wisc. Laws (West's 1973 Wisc. Legis. Serv. No. 2 at 240) ($25,000 maximum). However, the Michigan Department of Health exercises jurisdiction over
sewage treatment plants. The penalties for violation of this provision are a minimum
$25 and maximum $100 fine and/or a maximum 90 days in jail per day of violation.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 325.213 (1967).
88 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (Supp. 1972).
89 MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 21.
90
The WRC Act as originally enacted (the Stream Control Commission Act) employed minimal fines. Violation of the statute or of a commission order, was a misdemeanor, punishable by a minimum fine of $25 up to a maximum of $100, or
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likely to be cheaper for polluters than were the large expenditures needed
to provide pollution control equipment.9 ' State officials 2 and environmentalists9. 3 agree that high penalties should serve as an economic threat
sufficiently strong to deter a potential polluter from violating the law.
Unfortunately, because of the fear of adverse industry action, most states
did not have stiff penalties in their water pollution control laws prior to
the FWPCA.
FWPCA incentives were necessary to create monetary penalties for
94
tampering with monitoring devices and filing false surveillance reports,
although Michigan had previously realized that monitoring discharges was
essential to an adequate enforcement program. 95 Similarly, misrepresentations to the WRC in any proceedings were not punishable by monetary

imprisonment for up to 90 days, or both, in the court's discretion. No. 245, § 10,
[1929] Mich. Pub. Acts 599. Furthermore, it appears that the Stream Control Commission was reluctant to enforce these penalties. Five years after its creation, only
one case had been taken to court. MICH. STREAM CONTROL COMM'N, 2d BIENNIAL
REP. 11 (1934).
The 1929 fine structure was replaced in 1949 by a discretionary maximum fine of
$500, with no imprisonment penalty, for wilfull violations of the WRC Act. No. 117,
§ 9, [1949] Mich. Pub. Acts 122. The $500 fine was in the middle range of contemporary state water pollution law violation penalties. A survey of state legislation revealed
only three states with the highest fine of $1,000. See Weiss, supra note 37.
The WRC Act's 1965 amendment replaced the $500 maximum fine with a minimum $500 fine. See No. 405, § 10, [1965] Mich; Pub. Acts 825. Any potential abuse
arising from the lack of a maximum fine was effectively limited by the constitutional
provision that "excessive fines shall not be imposed ....
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
See In re Yell, 107 Mich. 228 (1895). For a discussion of judicial confusion resulting
from this 1965 fine provision see SYMPOSIUM, supra note 10, at 159. The minimum
fine has been construed to be a deliberate legislative attempt to provide a flexible
deterrent to water pollution. People v. American Oil Co., 3 E.R.C. 1835, 1837 (74th
Dist., Mich. 1972). See also People v. Bohn Aluminum Co., 3 E.R.C. 1034 (2d Dist.,
1st Div., Mich. 1971).
One marked deficiency of the 1965 WRC Act penalty section was the exemption
of violating municipalities from monetary liability. It is manifestly impractical to
enjoin the operation of a municipal sewage treatment plant which is violating the WRC
Act. See People ex rel. Stream Control Comm'n v. City of Port Huron, 323 Mich.
541, 545-46, 36 N.W.2d 138, 140 (1949). It would appear, then, that the 1965 WRC
Act left no judicial recourse to the state against a municipal violator. In 1972, the
municipality exemption was removed and a discretionary $10,000 fine was incorporated. No. 159, § 10, [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts 345.
91 Industrial interests wanted to mitigate the penalty provisions of the FWPCA,
claiming them to be too harsh, especially in the first instance of negligent pollution.
1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 1543. Industry also criticized the penalty
provision because no allowance was made for de minimis violations. Id. at 1077.
92 See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 588.
93 See, e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 603.
94 See 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(e)(4) (1973). Penalty provisions for violation of surveillance reporting requirements prior to the FWPCA called for revoking the treatment
facility operator's certificate and enjoining business operations. MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. §§ 323.6a -.6b (Supp. 1973). It has been suggested that the use of criminal penalties in a self-monitoring program should be avoided because of self-incrimination problems. See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 593. Contra, Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Sell-Incrimination, 65 COLUM L. REV. 681, 694
(1965).
95 See note 154 infra.
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penalties before the enactment of the FWPCA. 96 Such violations are
now under strong, effective criminal sanctions. The WRC Act, however,
makes no distinction between a knowingly false statement and an unintentionally false representation.9 7 This provision may thus be too strong.
The penalties could apparently be assessed for any inaccuracy in any
report received by the WRC from permit applicants. These strict provisions might inhibit compliance with the rest of the law and possibly divert
needed agency resources from protecting the waters to prosecuting typographical mistakes on reporting forms.
An imprisonment sanction was not included in the amended WRC
Act because there was no federal requirement to do so." An incarceration provision should be included. Since the WRC Act is a criminal statute, 9 an imprisonment penalty is consistent with the character of the
statute. Although some have called for the abolition of imprisonment
sanctions from pollution control statutes, 0 0 others maintain that imprisonment is the one sure deterrent to corporate polluters who can easily
afford a fine. 01' The latter position is the more easily supportable. The
$2,500 minimum fine could be absorbed by many major polluters without a significant alteration of their future behavior. A corporate decisionmaker, however, might change his corporation's pollution control practices
if he knew that he could go to jail for violation of the water pollution
statutes.
96See 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(e)(3) (1973). The WRC Act did contain a remedy for
one type of misrepresentation. Wastewater dischargers were required by No. 200,
§ 6b, [1970] Mich. Pub. Acts 573 to report to the WRC the quantities of "critical"
materials in their discharges, and were subject to enjoining their business operations
for violation, which presumably would include misrepresentations in the reports. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6b (Supp. 1973).
97 Compare No. 3, § 10(2), [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (1973 West's Mich. Legis.
Serv. No. 1 at 11), amending MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973) with
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (Supp. 1972).
98See 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(f), (g) (1973). The Model Act makes imprisonment a

supplementary penalty, but only for misrepresentation and monitoring device tampering. MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 21(b). The WRC Act originally provided for a
possible ninety-day jail sentence for violations. No. 245, § 10, [1929] Mich. Pub.
Acts 599. See note 90 supra. Many other pre-FWPCA statutes contain imprisonment
provisions. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.760 (1971). MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111,
§ 171 (1967).
99 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.9 (1967). The criminal penalties are mandatory, but the civil monetary penalties are imposed at the discretion of the court. No. 3,
§ 10, [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (1973 West's Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1 at I1), amending
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973). Some state statutes, on the other
hand, are civil statutes containing no criminal sanctions. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 66-28-10(7)(a) (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-54q (Supp. 1973); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-521.2 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112, § 1042 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1973).
100Comment, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 672, 708 (1973).
101 Lavin, Enforcement of Environmental Law on the Local Level, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 96-97 (C. Hassett ed. 1971). Imprisonment is an alternative sanction in
the FWPCA. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1), (2) (Supp. 1972). To ensure that corporate
officials are subject to imprisonment, the FWPCA includes "any responsible corprorate officer" as a "person" who can be imprisoned for violation of the FWPCA.

33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (Supp. 1972).
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One useful feature of the WRC Act is the power granted to the Attorney General to recover the value of injured natural resources and the
costs of surveillance.' 1 2 This provision had its origin prior to the
04
FWPCA'" : and provides guarantees beyond FWPCA requirements.'
Although supplementary to the punitive fines imposed by the WRC Act,
these remedial penalties prevent depletion of agency appropriations caused
by costs incurred in cleaning up pollution.
C. A dequate Authority

The final element of a good pollution control program is sufficient
agency authority to implement standards and levy penalties. This authority must include the ability to seek injunctive relief for pollution abatement and the power to institute emergency clean-up proceedings once a
hazardous pollution spill has occurred. In Michigan, the Attorney General
has had authority to institute civil proceedings to enjoin any violation of
the WRC Act.' 15 When there is an emergency situation created by pollutant spillage, however, even the few days involved in normal court
proceedings are felt to be too long a delay in the clean-up effort. 106 To
remedy this situation, the WRC has recently used a $25,000 emergency
clean-up fund for immediate remedial action. 10 7 This fund appears to be
102 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973), as amended, No. 3 § 10(2),
[1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (West's 1973 Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1 at 11). There may be
evidentiary difficulties in valuing an injured environment, but these appear slight
when compared with the laudable public policy delineated in this provision. Many
states have similar provisions for recovery of monies for injury to natural resources.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:1446 (Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.12(b)
(Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-338 (Supp. 1973), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-SA19a (1970).
10:3 See No. 405, § 10, [1965] Mich. Pub. Acts 825.
104 These powers are recommended, though not required, by the EPA guidelines
for the purpose of acquiring additional funds for state program efforts. 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.73 comment (1973).
105 No. 3, § 10(1), [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (West's 1973 Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1
at 11), amending MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973). Prior to the
FWPCA-required enactment of Section 10(1) of the WRC Act, the Attorney General
could enjoin a waste discharge only if it caused a public nuisance violation of Section
6(a) of the WRC Act. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6(c) (Supp. 1973). Section 3
of the WRC Act author ipes the WRC to initiate injunctive proceedings. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 323.3 (1967). The WRC, however, has delegated its power to the Attorney General. See Mich. Ad. Code R 323.1027, Supp. No. 72 at 35-36 (1972).
106 Interview with Robert Courchaine, Chief Engineer, Bureau of Water Management and Water Resources Comm'n, Mich. Dep't of Natural Resources, in Lansing,
Michigan, Oct. 5, 1973.
107 MICH. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, MICHIGAN

TROL PROGRAM
NATURAL

STATE WATER POLLUTION CON-

100 (1973). See BUREAU OF WATER MANAGEMENT, MICH. DEP'T OF

RESOURCES,

MICHIGAN'S

CONTINGENCY

PLAN

FOR

OIL

AND

HAZARDOUS

MATERIALS POLLUTION (1973) (description of the procedures involved in emergency
cleanups).
States are not necessarily required by the FWPCA to utilize emergency procedures.
Emergency authority is necessary only if the state wishes to receive federal monies
for its water pollution control program. 33 U.S.C. § 1256(e) (Supp. 1972). State
emergency authority must be comparable to Section 504 of FWPCA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1364 (Supp. 1972), which provides for emergency abatement upon a showing of
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a successful venture.108 Moreover, it has been supplemented by the provision, added to the WRC Act by Act 3, allowing the WRC to request
the Attorney General to institute an action for injunctive relief. 109
Even though these emergency powers are combined with the Attorney
General's power to seek injunctions, they should be increased. The WRC
itself should have authority to issue a judicially enforceable emergency
abatement order, without notice and backed by statutory fines for noncompliance. This type of provision is needed because of past difficulties
in referring matters to the Attorney General's office for enforcement
action. 110 Similar authority exists in other pollution control areas in
Michigan, 1" ' other state statutes, 112 the Model Act,1 13 and a previous
model water code." 4 Fairness to those affected by an emergency order
can be assured by holding a public hearing immediately following the
issuance of the order, and by providing for an automatic dissolution of the
order within a specified time period if the agency cannot prove its case
in court. Failure to comply with an emergency order should subject the
1 15
recalcitrant party to a suit for criminal and civil damages.
"imminent and substantial endangerment" to the health, welfare, or livelihood of
the public.
A statutory authorization to the WRC to use up to $20,000 for each emergency
was proposed for the WRC Act's amendment enacted as Act 293 of 1972, H.B. 6186
(1972), but later deleted (Substitute H.B. 6186 (1972)) because of lack of funding.
MICH. DEP'T OF ADMINISTRATION, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 6186 at 1 (1972); MICH. DEP'T
OF ADMINISTRATION, ANALYSIS OF SUBSTITUTE H.B. 6186 at 1 (1972). The emergency

fund in H.B. 6186 was to have protected inland waters not subject to federal jurisdiction. MICH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 6186 at 1 (1972).
The emergency fund is a welcome innovation as long as there are procedures guaranteeing the recovery of funds. Michigan dischargers have generally reimbursed the
WRC for its expenses in cleaning up their waste spills. But because of the small
funding, delays in repayments by dischargers have depleted the fund to seriously low
levels. See Mich. Water Resources Comm'n, Meeting Minutes, Mar. 22-23, 1973, at 12.
108 In fourteen months of operation, there have been twelve applications of the
emergency clean-up fund. Interview with Robert Courchaine, supra note 106. See also
MICH.

WATER

RESOURCES COMM'N,

MICHIGAN

STATE

WATER POLLUTION

CONTROL

PROGRAM 100 (1973). It would appear, however, that use of the fund is excessively

selective. In 1973, the Oil Pollution Control Section of the WRC responded to 413
reported petroleum product losses. Id. Most of those could have required use of the
emergency fund. Apparently recognizing this need, the legislature has considered a
bill to replace the existing fund which would provide up to $20,000 per emergency
incident. S.B. 209 (1973).
109 No. 3, § 10(1), [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (West's 1973 Mich. Legis. Serv. No. I
at 11), amending MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.10 (Supp. 1973).
110 Representatives of the WRC have in the past refused to act as complaining
witnesses without a previous formal referral from the WRC to the Attorney General's
office for legal action. See Mich. Water Resources Comm'n, Meeting Minutes, Aug.
23-24, 1973, at 4.
111 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 319.211 et seq. (Supp. 1973) (waste disposal in
deep wells); Mich. Ad. Code R 299.2296, Supp. No. 72 at 26 (1972).
112 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-520 (1971); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.071
(Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116.11 (Supp. 1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 445.330
(1971).
113 MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 17. The administrative order procedure is favored
to ensure prompt remedial action. Id. comment.
114 F. MALONEY, R. AUSNESS & J. MORRIS, A MODEL WATER CODE

§

5.13 (1972).

115 Emergency orders under the FWPCA are court enforced. 33 U.S.C. § 1364
(Supp. 1972). There are no provisions, unfortunately, for seeking fines against persons
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Another weakness in the WRC Act is the absence of a provision giving
the WRC staff power to issue a compliance order to a violating discharger
without waiting for Commission action. This procedure is authorized by
both the FWPCA 116 and the Model Act, "1 7 and its unavailability has
been a source of difficulty for the WRC. 1" 8 Although it has been suggested that such a.procedure would be unfair to the person ordered to
comply,'" it would seem that adequate administrative and judicial review would prevent any possible discriminatory practices by an agency.
There are several reasons for permitting administrative staff orders. First,
they allow immediate action to remedy a violation without the need to
wait for the regular monthly meeting of the WRC. Secondly, the burden
of proof is on a permit holder to dispel any doubts about his compliance
20
with a permit.'
A further aid in speeding up enforcement proceedings would be to allow
the agency to administer fines as well as issue compliance orders.1'2 ' The
civil penalty would necessarily be based on a factual showing of violation.
This procedure is practicable given an adequate monitoring system which
not complying with the orders. The EPA advocated allowing suits to recover such
fines. 1971 House Hearings,supra note 16, at 302.

11633 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (Supp. 1972). Procedures for a direct administrative
order are more easily facilitated in the FWPCA because the administrative agency
is not governed, as in most states, by a board representing regulated interests. This'
traditional organizational scheme of the state agencies may be one factor inhibiting
prompt state action. The compliance order procedure is not specifically required for
inclusion in state programs. Se'e 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. 1972); 40 C.F.R. § 124.73(a)
(1973).
117 MODEL ACT, supra note 11, § 18.
118 The WRC has occasionally circumvented its normal administrative process by
employing the "direct action" Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 691.1201 et seq. (Supp. 1973), to enforce immediate compliance by a
violator of the WRC Act. See Water Resources Comm'n v. Chippewa County, No.
1255 (Cir. Ct., Chippewa County, Mich., May 27, 1971) discussed in Sax & Conner,
Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L.

1003, 1020-25 (1972).
The WRC field staff has used a "cease and desist" order not specifically authorized
by the WRC Act with varying results. Compliance was not achieved in the Woodward
Development case, where a developer allowed erosion of dirt piles to pollute a small
trout stream in Traverse City, Michigan. See The North Woods Call, Feb. 7, 1973, at
11; July 11, 1973, at 11; Aug. 1, 1973, at 3. On the other hand, such an order achieved
compliance by Minerals Recovery Corporation, an industry causing unusual turbidity
in a small creek.
It has been suggested that the WRC staff be authorized by the WRC to make such
orders between the WRC monthly meetings. Mich. Water Resources Comm'n, Meeting Minutes, Aug. 23-24, 1973, at 7-8. Some other states allow enforcement actions
without prior approval by the governing board. See 4 BNA ENv. REP., CURRENT
DEVS. 280 (1973).
REV.

119 See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 1543:
20

1 MICH. COMp. LAWs ANN. § 323.7(1) (Supp. 1973), as amended, No. 3, § 7(1),
[19731 Mich. Pub. Acts (West's 1973 Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 1 at 10). Previous Michi-

gan statutory provisions placed the burden on the WRC to prove noncompliance with
the law. See No. 200, § 7, [1970] Mich. Pub. Acts 573.
121

See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 1820-21. Several state water pol-

lution control statutes authorize administrative fines. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.121(2)(a) (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, § 28A(g) (Supp. 1973); Miss.

§ 7106-127(a) (Supp. 1972); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 691.605 (Supp. 1973).
CODE ANN.

§

445.345 (1971); PA. STAT.
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can give quantitative indications of violations. Under the prior water
quality standards, 122 such a procedure would have been impossible because of the awesome requirements imposed upon the agency to prove a
violation.
Finally, the elimination of agency discretion to decide whether or not
to enforce the law is essential to the maintenance of an effective pollution
control program. To remedy violations of the WRC Act, 12 : the WRC
has broad, discretionary authority, which it jealously guards.124 This discretion has been vigorously criticized by environmentalists. 125 It would
seem that a water pollution control agency should be a conduit for implementing the goals set forth by the legislature to eliminate water pollution.
The agency must necessarily have the discretion to set standards and
procedures to implement that goal practicably, but a violation of quantitative standards should not be subject to the same degree of discretion.

IIl. IMPLEMENTATION

DIFFICULTIES AND SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS

Federal programs in water pollution control have historically been failures.1 2 61 It appears that the FWPCA has not completely remedied these

122 See notes 66-73 and accompanying text supra.
123 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.3 (1967); id. § 323.5 (Supp. 1973); id.
§ 323.10 (Supp. 1973), as amended, No. 3, § 10, [1973] Mich. Pub. Acts (West's 1973
Mich. Legis. Serv. No. I at 11).
124 Despite the Attorney General's independent power to institute injunctive proceedings under the WRC Act (see note 33 supra), the WRC holds the basic power to
enforce the WRC Act:
[T]he Commission maintains the perogative [sic] of indicating priority
items, holding a particular case in abayance [sic], or modifying any
request submitted to the Attorney General's Office by the Commission.
Letter from Ralph W. Purdy, Executive Director, Michigan Water Resources Comm'n
to Francis T. Mayo, Region V Administrator, EPA, Aug. 21, 1973, reprinted in
Statement by Dale S. Bryson, Deputy Director, Enforcement Division, Region V,
EPA, in Public Hearing on State of Michigan 402(b) Request to Operate NPDES
Permit Program,Attachment 3, at 16 (1973).
125 See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 727; 1971 House Hearings, supra
note 16, at 455; 1971 House Amendment Hearings,supra note 19, at 1151.
126 The federal government has not been able to point to any instance where its
programs have significantly improved the water quality of a region. D. ZWICK &
M. BENSTOCK, supra note 1, at 200. See generally House Oversight Hearings, supra
note 17, at 175-259.
It has never been entirely clear whether or not EPA would have adequate resources
to fulfill its nondelegable duties under the FWPCA, and a fortiori the capacity to
administer a nationwide NPDES program. The problem is compounded because some
states may decide not to administer their own permit program in light of the huge
financial outlay necessary to operate a state water pollution program. 3 BNA ENV.
REP., CURRENT DEVS. 1020-21 (1973). E.g., Alaska, Rhode Island, and Washington,
D.C., 4 BNA ENV. REP., CURRENT DEVS. 365 (1973).
A further cause of federal failure in water pollution control has been its inability
to supervise the states. It appears that the twenty-eight states with fully approved
water quality standards in 1971 under the 1965 Water Quality Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1160(c) (1970), did not utilize certain elements necessary for an adequate pollution
control program. D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, supra note 1, at 279-80.
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deficiencies.1 2 7 Good state water pollution control efforts, therefore, remain necessary to any national goal of water pollution elimination.
The Michigan Water Resources Commission is widely believed to be
pursuing one of the better state water pollution control programs in the
nation, although some dispute this assertion.12 , The WRC, however, is
all too typical of state agencies in many respects. Historically, it has had a
crippling lack of funding. 1'1 As a consequence, its manpower needs have
suffered continuous shortages."" An obvious additional source of funding to remedy these ills is the federal government. The FWPCA has recognized this fact by allotting large initial appropriations to the state agencies to assist their programs."' Continuing appropriations are subject to
certain restrictions, including continued state funding at no less than 1971
levels. 1: 2 This additional source of money will significantly augment
Michigan's program funding.' '
127 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fri, 3 E.L.R. 20587 (D.D.C. 1973),.
in which defendant EPA and the plaintiffs stipulated that the defendant had not met
statutory deadlines for inter alia, designation of water quality control problem areas.
128 A comparison of the WRC Act with other state acts was made in 1964. Compared to statutes in California, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin,
the 1949 WRC Act was superior in the areas of intergovernmental cooperation, jurisdiction, administrative hearings, data compilation, requests for funding, and cooperation with the federal government. Composition of the governing board was considered
a deficiency. No mention was made, however, of the Michigan "order of determination" system or of the WRC Act's inadequate statutory sanctions. See Note, Water
Pollution-State Control Committee. 17 VAND. L. REV. 1364 (1964).
Some of the witnesses at the public hearing on Michigan's application to receive
permanent NPDES authority were less than happy with the Water Resources Commission:
We have also repeatedly urged the Michigan Water Resources Commission to implement a meaningful policy of enforcement with stiff penalties. Needless to say, we have not been satisfied throughout these
many years with the performance record of Michigan's Water Resources
Commission, nor are we satisfied now.
Public Hearing, supra note 16, at 57-58 (statement of John Yolton, United Auto
Workers).
129 In 1930, the WRC's predecessor, the Stream Control Commission, received an
appropriation of $27,200. MICH. STREAM CONTROL COMM'N, 2d BIENNIAL REP. 11
(1934). By fiscal 1966, the appropriation had risen to only $361,655. MICH. WATER
RESOURCES COMM'N, 47 Q. BULL. 1, 48 Q. BULL. 2 (1965).
130 In 1933-34, the Stream Control Commission employed full-time an executive
secretary, two engineers, an investigator, and a stenographer. MICH. STREAM CONTROL
COMM'N, 2d BIENNIAL REP. 8 (1934). This necessitated reliance on other state and
federal agencies to do investigative work for the Stream Control Commission.
Similarly, in 1964, the Public Administration Service of the U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare found that 108 persons worked for the WRC, but
that 171 would be desirable. 1971 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 17, at 51-52.
See also White Lake Improvement Ass'n. v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262,
269, 177 N.W.2d 473, 475 (1970).
131 For fiscal 1974, $75,000,000 is to be distributed to the states. 33 U.S.C. § 1256
(a)(2) (Supp. 1972). Of this amount, Michigan is supposed to receive $1,431,287.
MICH.

WATER

RESOURCES

COMM'N, MICHIGAN

STATE WATER

POLLUTION

CONTROL

PROGRAM iv (1973).
132 33 U.S.C. § 1256(d) (Supp. 1972). Other requirements are the annual compila-

tion of water quality data and submission of a water pollution control plan. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1256 (e), (f) (Supp. 1972).
133 Michigan's minimum appropriation will have to remain at its 1971 level of
$992,000. See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 94. For fiscal 1974, Michigan's
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One possible addition to funding for enforcement activities is the payment of civil and criminal penalty monies into a special abatement fund.
This system is operative in other states,1 34 and, with aggressive use of
the penalty structures of the WRC Act, could markedly increase the funds
available. Although the existence of such a fund might lead to overzealous
enforcement, that alternative is preferable to lax implementation of the
law because of inadequate appropriations.
Another disappointing similarity between the WRC and other state
agencies has been its continuing use of the voluntary compliance method
of pollution control. 135 This practice developed because of insufficient
agency resources.' 3 6 It is favored by polluters because it shields them
from public scrutiny. Agencies have also preferred the method because
of their distaste for preparing an evidentially sound case for presentation
in court. The voluntary compliance method has failed to a great extent
in Michigan. Although mere agency presence may intimidate small polluters, chronic problem areas, such as the Detroit River, have not been
37
amenable -to such a solution.'
One reason for this failure is the lack of a credible threat to back up
WRC demands for compliance. Action by the attorney general has been
found extremely helpful in many states in enforcing compliance with water
pollution control agency orders. 13 8 In Michigan, however, the same procedure has secured mixed results, for although the WRC feels that polluters comply with its demands when they know the Attorney General
will use his injunctive power against them if they refuse to comply,'139
state appropriation is $1,780,452 with an additional $1,126,122 from the surveillance

fee program.

MICH. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, MICHIGAN STATE WATER POLLUTION

CONTROL PROGRAM iV (1973). $380,861 of this fund, or 8.8 percent, will be provided
for enforcement activities. Id. vi. It should be noted that this enforcement funding is
greater than the total 1966 appropriation. See note 129 supra.
1971 fundings in some states barely sustained water pollution control programs.
See U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION ABATEMENT

PROGRAM:

ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 27 (1972) [hereinafter

cited as GAO REPORT]. These states should be especially benefited by increased
federal funding.
134 See, e.g., CALIF. WATER CODE §§ 13385, 13387(a) (West Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 403.165 (Supp. 1973); MD.-ANN. CODE art. 96A, § 28A(g) (Supp. 1973).
135 In 1940, cooperation by polluters was sought more readily than court action,
presumably because the Stream Control Commission felt it could not work out
amicable solutions in court. MICH. STREAM CONTROL COMM'N, 5th BIENNIAL REP.
53 (1940). Present objections to court proceedings center on the expense and trouble
of judicial enforcement. Interview with Robert Courchaine, supra note 106.
6
13 The staff employed by the Stream Control Commission was not sufficient to
document cases for enforcement proceedings. See note 130 supra.
137 Federal assistance was required to merely survey the extent of the Detroit
River problem in 1962. See Purdy, The Water Situation Today-Pollution and Its
Control, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WATER RESOURCES CONFERENCE, Lansing, Michigan
10-11 (1962).
It appears that 1,050 out of 35,000 miles of Michigan streams do not meet current
water quality standards. These are primarily located below major population centers,
where most chronic pollution occurs. MICH. WATtR RESOURCES COMM'N, WATER
STRATEGY FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 3 (1973).
8
13 GAO REPORT, supra note 133, at 19.
139 Interview with Robert Courchaine, supra note 106.

WINTER 1974]

Michigan WRC Act Amendments

jurisdictional problems 140 and severe staff shortages 41 have handicapped utilization of the Attorney General's office by the WRC. Although
the quality of work by the Michigan Attorney General's office in the area
of water pollution control appears to have improved recently, 1 42 inadequate staff prevents prosecution of even flagrant cases.' 43 One viable
remedy would be the use of agency attorneys.14 4 Such a program would
provide better coordination between the enforcement data-gathering personnel and the attorneys and would separate the legal staff from any funding problems the Attorney General's office might have. Use of agency
attorneys would also permit the attorneys to become full-time specialists
in water pollution control enforcement, contrary to the situation in most
states.14
Another reason for the failure of the WRC's voluntary compliance
method has been its underutilization of existing statutory fines. One of the
purposes of fines for pollution violations is to deter potential violators.' 46
This rationale is ignored by the WRC. Fines are used for only special
situations, such as repeated violations. 147 This attitude may have been
caused by inadequate statutory authorization. The WRC may have felt
that its efforts would be wasted in seeking a fine disproportionately small
in comparison to the costs of clean-up and the value of the damaged
natural resources. Nevertheless, the legislature would be understandably
hesitant to give the WRC more power when it has not utilized the power
140 The Attorney General has usually turned water pollution cases over to local
authorities who go to the district courts. This resulted in a fine of $500 for a large
fish kill in the celebrated McLouth Steel case. See Detroit News, July 23, 1971, at
10-A, col. 8. The WRC has suggested that stiffer penalties might be obtained by
using the circuit courts. Id.
141 The Stream Control Commission in 1938 requested the full-time services of
one assistant attorney general. MICH. STREAM CONTROL COMM'N, 4th BIENNIAL REP.
12 (1938). Requests for additional legal services continue to occur. See Mich. Water
Resources Comm'n, Meeting Minutes, Mar. 22-23, 1973, at 5.
142 See Mich. Water Resources Comm'n, Meeting Minutes, Sept. 20-21, 1973, at 9.
143 See id., Apr. 26, 1973 at 5. The Department of Natural Resources has eight
full-time attorneys assigned to it, but there are effectively only two attorneys working
in the Environmental Protection branch, which serves the Water Resources Commission and the Air Pollution Control Commission. Interview with Charles S. Alpert,
Assistant Attorney General, in Lansing, Michigan, Oct. 9, 1973.
144 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 70.3 34 (Supp. 1973). Pennsylvania uses this system in preference to depending on the Attorney General's office. See 1971 House
Oversight Hearings,supra note 17, at 405.

145 Most states found that the attorneys assigned to pollution cases were inexperienced and moved into other types of practice after a short while. GAO REPORT,

supra note 133, at 25.
146 See People v. American Oil Co., 3 E.R.C. 1835, 1840 (74th Dist., Mich. 1972).
147 Interview with Robert Courchaine, supra note 106. See also MICH. WATER
RESOURCES COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDURES (1971). One of these special
situations was the McLouth Steel case, where the WRC hoped to get affirmative
action with a $20,000 fine. Detroit Free Press, Feb. 28, 1971, at 2-A, col. 1. But the
judge, construing the 1965 $500 minimum fine provision to be a maximum limit,
assessed the company only $500. Id., July 21, 1971, at 6-A, col. 1. See note 90 supra.
The WRC seems to still regard fines as an extraordinary remedy. The Commission
argues that if a polluter satisfactorily cleans up its spill, nothing would be gained by
assessing a fine. See Mich. Water Resources Comm'n, Meeting Minutes, May 24-25,
1973, at 6.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 7:455

it has.' 4S The penalty structure imposed by the FWPCA appears to have
been necessary to break this deadlock. The WRC's position has been
made much stronger by the new effluent limitations scheme, and any
proven violation carries a minimum $2,500 fine. This fact will make the
WRC's enforcement job easier, because the high penalties will hopefully
reduce the number of future violations through their deterrent value.
The use of areawide planning by a state agency is essential for maximum utilization of meager state resources. Until mandated by the
FWPCA, 141 Michigan, like many other states,' ° did not comprehensively plan its pollution control program. It employed the case-by-case
method of singly dealing with polluters. Although this approach is viable
if there is only a single waste discharger on a given body of water, it fails
to recognize the cumulative nature of most water pollution. Only when a
water pollution control agency develops a coordinated plan for pollution
abatement can the goal of pollution elimination be effectuated. 151
An important aspect of any implementation scheme is the attitude of
the agency. Historically, the WRC's attitude has been cautious, possibly
since the goals of its enabling legislation were not consonant with public
desires. 152 This kind of attitude, however, is also caused by simple bu153
reaucratic inertia.
A program of preventative action is increasingly considered an essential
element of pollution control. The WRC has to an extent recognized this
fact, by its usage of the critical materials list pursuant to the 1970 "Truth
148 In the McLouth Steel case, supra note 147, the WRC was hampered by the fact
that it had no power to levy fines. See Lansing State J., July 25, 1971, at E-8, col. 1.
149 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (Supp. 1972).
150 Hines, supra note 5, at 233. One of the most frequently voiced requests for
improvement of the state administration of water resources has been the addition of

a comprehensive planning process.
ADMINISTRATION

COUNCIL OF
OF WATER RESOURCES 35 (1957).

STATE

GOVERNMENTS,

STATE

There are some modern state

water pollution control statutes enacted prior to the FWPCA which contained provisions calling for comprehensive planning. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13140-47
(1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-28-5(c) (Supp. 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-505
(1971). Others, however, merely authorize planning. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-1856 (Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 361 (Supp. 1973).
151 It is not entirely certain that state comprehensive plans, formulated pursuant
to the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (f), (g) (Supp. 1972), fulfill these goals. For
instance, Michigan's current plan lists the Rouge River as thirty-seventh in priority
for pollution control. MICH. WATER RESOURCES COMM'N, MICHIGAN STATE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL PLAN 12 (1973). The Rouge, however, has recently been called
one of the ten most polluted rivers in the United States. D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK,
supra note 1, at 193-94.
152 Under the 1929 Act, No. 245, [1929] Mich. Pub. Acts 597, the Stream Control
Commission was obligated to tell complainants that even nuisance conditions could
not be remedied by the Stream Control Commission unless fish were killed. MICH.
STREAM CONTROL COMM'N, 2d BIENNIAL REP. 16 (1934). Even after the actionable
injuries were increased by the 1949 WRC Act amendments, No. 117, [1949] Mich.
Pub. Acts 120, the WRC's limited resources left all but the most severe pollution
violations to local authorities, despite public complaints. See Mich. Water Resources
8 Q. BULL. 3 (1955).
Comm'n,
15
3 See e.g., 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 2; at 561. See D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, supra note 1, at 382-88.
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in Pollution" amendments to the WRC Act. 154 Another more innovative
solution has been the promulgation of Oil Spillage Rules. 55 These
rules provide for measures to be taken by all persons storing oil or critical materials to prevent the spillage and spread of such materials in the
event of a spill. Although the rules are possibly a unique 156 step by a
state agency acting on its own initiative, they are a halfway measure.
Materials not on the critical materials list, but which can nevertheless
cause environmental injury, 157 are not subject to the rules. A more effective program would requi.e similar measures for all materials likely to
harm state waters.
It thus appears that the massive disruption of state water pollution programs by the FWPCA was a necessary element in the improvement of
state efforts. Without the FWPCA, the states probably would have con-

154 No. 200, [1970] Mich. Pub. Acts 571. The amendments are designed to give
the WRC notice of all toxic substances which may accidentally be discharged into
waters. Mich. Water Resources Comm'n Release, Michigan's "Truth in Pollution" Act
200 (1970). See generally Brown & Duncan, Legal Aspects of a Federal Water Quality
Surveillance System, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1131 (1970). The "Truth in Pollution" Act
was a response to a mercury contamination crisis in the Great Lakes which brought
the legislature to the realization that the surveillance and water quality monitoring
provisions of the WRC Act were totally inadequate. See 1971 House Amendment
Hearings, supra note 22, at 502.
The Truth in Pollution amendments did not, however, go far enough toward
achieving an effective monitoring program. Reporting helps to determine the extent
of water quality violations, but does not by itself mandate the reduction of those
pollutants or even indicate the quantities of discharged wastes. This defect was remedied by Act 293 of 1972, No. 293, § 6b, [1972] Mich. Pub. Acts 899, which required
quantities, as well as the nature, of critical materials to be reported. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 323.6b (Supp. 1973).
Increased surveillance requires increased financing, %.hich was provided by requiring
dischargers to pay for their surveillance. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.13
(Supp. 1973). This system of monitoring fees is said to be unique. See Symposium,
supra note 10, at 148 n.90. Apparently, other states are using Michigan's law as a
model for similar legislation. 4 CCH CLEAN AIR AND WATER NEWS 777 (1972). The
surveillance fee system appears to be functioning successfully. As of March 20, 1973,
95 percent of the surveillance fees for fiscal year 1973 had been paid. Mich. Water
Resources Comm'n, Meeting Minutes, Mar. 22-23, 1973 at 21.
155 Mich. Ad. Code R 323.1151-.1169, Supp. No. 75 at 22 (1973).
156 Interview with William G. Turney, supra note 33. But see ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.03.822-28 (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE § 39-105(3)(k) (Supp. 1973) (authorize
agency control over storage of hazardous materials).
157 See, e.g., Mich. Water Resources Comm'n, Meeting Minutes, Sept. 20-21, 1973,
at 29, wherein it was reported that a total of 31,048 fish were killed in spills of milk,
molasses, and chlorine.
The definition of a toxic pollutant under the FWPCA, see note 27 supra, appears
to be more comprehensive than the comparable Michigan provision:
"Toxic substance" means a substance of unnatural origin, except heat,
in concentrations or combinations which are or may become harmful
to plant or animal life.

Mich. Ad. Code R 323.1044(1) in Mich. Dep't of Natural Resources, Water Resources Comm'n Release, General Rules Part 4: Water Quality Standards (1973).
Naturally occurring disease-causing organisms present in wastewater would be exemp-

ted from the Michigan definition. Discharge of wastes of this type, however, would
be injurious to the public health and therefore abatable under Section 6 of the WRC

Act. See note 44 supra.
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tinued their incomplete pollution control programs, being satisfied with a
partial elimination of the water pollution problem.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Michigan Water Resource Commission Act, although a basically
sound water pollution statute, has suffered from some statutory inadequacies and implementation deficiencies. Although the need for a comprehensive water pollution program has existed since its inception, the WRC
Act has failed to completcly protect Michigan's waters from pollution.
Like the experience in most other states, this failure was a consequence of
inherent inadequacies of state efforts caused by insuffiicent funding, fear
of industrial reaction to stringent laws, and a cautious agency attitude.
The recurrence of these problems on a nationwide basis necessitated the
enactment of the FWPCA and its radical reordering of pollution control
theories, which gave a much-needed boost to the Michigan program.
Without the FWPCA, states would probably never have accomplished
satisfactory control over water pollution. Whether or not the federal government can achieve this goal better than the states will be seen when a
comparison can be made between an existing state program and a state in
which the EPA must operate the pollution control program. For Michigan, the imposition of federal standards means that state waters should
receive the proper attention they have missed while under the jurisdiction
of the Water Resources Commission.
-Jeffrey K. Haynes

